DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

February 14, 1959

To:

From:

EUR - Mr. Merchant

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Authorized Ey: il. D. Eronouer August 4, 1975 /777

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Re your memorandum of February 13 on the conversation with the Chancellor - I agree that he was far from being totally forthcoming. I think, however, he did respond affirmatively to the Secretary's reference to a strong policy (which in the context of the discussion was the Secretary's exposition of our contingency planning) but Adenauer did display what seemed to me almost an obsession on nuclear weapons. We will want to read carefully the verbatim transcript which Weber, the interpreter, promised to provide David Bruce since my memorandum was drafted on the basis of fairly sketchy notes. The possibility, of course, that the transcript will be edited in some degree is however obvious.

I was somewhat disturbed by this meeting with Adenauer, more so than the Secretary. The Chancellor's opening remarks struck me at the time and on reflection as somewhat less than robust. I talked to David about it at some length afterwards and I think his view was that it a variant of the Chancellor's usual tactics of taking a stronger or more advanced position in order to elicit from us our true intent and it may well be that in this instance the Chancellor was adopting deliberately a weaker position to see if the Secretary would fall in with it or take a firmer line. I hope this is the case and it may well be so. Nevertheless earlier in the conversation I didn't feel that the Chancellor had spoken all that he had in his mind when he responded to the Secretary's query as to what he meant by a "provisional solution" for West Berlin.

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